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Abstract – This work propose a new Kalman filter-based 
method for integrity monitoring, following the solution 
separation approach of the Advanced Receiver 
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (ARAIM) algorithm. 
This method evaluates the separation of state correction 
using different subsets of measurement to detect 
abnormalities as well as potential faulty satellites for 
exclusion. This approach differs from existing Kalman 
filter-based methods, which use innovation vector or 
residual vector for stochastic evaluation.  
Keywords – GNSS, Integrity monitoring, ARAIM, 
Solution Separation, Kalman Filter 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Integrity, as defined in [1], is the capability of a 
GNSS system to provide timely warning to users 
when the system becomes unreliable and should not 
be used for navigation purposes. In other words, 
integrity evaluates the level of trust a user can assign 
on the information provided by a system [2]. Integrity 
concerns with the faults within the navigation system, 
such as satellites faults, incorrect ephemeris 
parameters, and any fault that could lead to hazardous 
outcome if the wrong information is used.  
Defined since the early days of GPS, the concept 
of integrity was designed for civil aviation use, 
specifically in the Communication, Navigation and 
Surveillance / Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) 
system [3]. Integrity has always been an important 
aspect of the navigation system, since the validity of 
navigation data could affect lives of many people. To 
realize the integrity assessment process, some 
concepts should be mentioned [2]: 
• Protection Level (PL): the statistical bound 
surrounding the calculated position, ensuring 
to cover the true position at a certain level of 
confidence. PL is defined in horizontal and 
vertical direction, namely Horizontal 
Protection Level (HPL) and Vertical 
Protection Level (VPL), respectively. The 
probability of positioning error exceeding the 
PL is less than or equal the integrity risk. 
• Integrity risk: the probability that actual 
position error exceeds PL. In literatures, 
integrity risk is also denoted Probability of 
Hazardous Misleading Information (PHMI). 
There are several approaches for the integrity 
assessment process. The first approach utilizes the 
Satellite-based Augmentation System (SBAS), which 
involves external monitoring systems and additional 
satellite systems to broadcast the integrity monitoring 
data to users. SBASes are regional systems, such as 
the WAAS covering the North America area, or the 
EGNOS covering the EU and North Africa region. 
Other SBAS includes MSAS and QZSS in Japan, 
GAGAN in India. The second approach uses the 
Ground-based Augmentation System (GBAS) which, 
as the name suggests, usually consists of a monitoring 
system and a transmitter on the ground (instead of 
satellites) to relay information directly to the users. 
GBASes are often implemented in airfields to assist 
precision landing of civil aircraft, since they can 
provide real-time and accurate integrity assessment, 
especially under bad weather or when SBAS is not 
available. Despite high performance, both SBAS and 
GBAS suffer from coverage problem, since each 
approach can only cover certain areas of services. The 
third approach is called Aircraft-based Augmentation 
System (ABAS), which is a set of internal algorithms 
that utilize solely the navigation data (and optionally, 
data from external sensors) available on board for 
integrity assessment. Although having lower 
performance than SBAS and GBAS, ABAS is still a 
favorable choice due to its versatility and autonomous 
nature. The most prominent set of ABAS is the 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) 
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algorithms [4], typically used during phases of flight 
without stringent requirement.  
The integrity assessment process using RAIM 
algorithms usually consists of two main steps. The 
first step is called Fault Detection and Exclusion 
(FDE), in which RAIM performs consistency test to 
check for faults in the input data, then the algorithm 
may attempt to exclude the faulty input if any. If the 
input is deemed consistent, RAIM proceeds to the 
next step, which is to calculate the PL. In short, the 
goals of the integrity assessment process are to protect 
users from excessive positioning errors by detecting 
and mitigating (if possible) the faults, and alert users 
in the worst case. There are two main approaches for 
RAIM methods: residual-based approach [4], which 
operates in pseudorange domain, and solution 
separation approach [5], which runs in solution 
domain. While residual-based RAIM is simple and 
fast, solution separation RAIM can have better 
performance due to its customization [6]. RAIM 
algorithms operate under several assumptions [4]: 
• Only one constellation is used (although it's 
possible to extend the algorithm to multi-
constellation), 
• There is at most one satellite fault at a time, 
• The PL depends mostly on the satellite 
geometry. 
On the other hand, recent works in navigation 
integrity [7][8][9][10] for aviation have led to the next 
generation of RAIM algorithm, called Advanced 
RAIM (ARAIM) [7][11], based on the solution 
separation approach. ARAIM improves the traditional 
RAIM in various ways, such as multi-constellation 
capability (traditional RAIM was developed solely for 
GPS), generalized satellite fault hypothesis instead of 
single-fault hypothesis. ARAIM aims at providing 
better availability, lower PL [12][13][14], making it 
suitable for more stringent phases of flight which are 
usually protected by SBAS and GBAS [11]. 
While the RAIM (and ARAIM) algorithms 
mentioned above are developed for least-square (LS) 
positioning method, there are also RAIM methods 
designed when using Kalman Filter (KF) approach. 
Most methods follow residual-based approach, using 
the innovation vector [15] or the ranging residual 
vector [16][17] for the consistency test, as well as 
corresponding methods to calculate the PL. It's worth 
mentioning that, the traditional RAIM for LS is a 
snapshot method and the LS itself is memoryless, 
consequently the whole LS-based integrity assessment 
process using traditional RAIM is memoryless. In 
contrast, the authors of [16] pointed out the sequential 
nature of KF and consequently took this into account 
when proposing the batch-processing version of 
RAIM for KF. As many other works, these works 
were developed in aviation context, utilizing the well-
founded standards and models for civil aviation [19]. 
Taking into account the previously presented 
literature, this paper proposes a solution separation 
RAIM method for standalone KF as an adaptation of 
the ARAIM method in [11] for KF. The proposed 
method combines the advantages of the underlying 
techniques: the smoothness and high accuracy of KF, 
the good integrity performance and flexibility of 
solution separation ARAIM approach. On the other 
hand, the solution separation approach also performs 
well against sudden changes in the measurement. The 
paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
KF model used for navigation and subsequent 
integrity assessment. Section III presents in details the 
derivation of the PL equations for KF-based ARAIM. 
From this, Section IV explains the proposed ARAIM 
method. Section V concludes the paper. 
II. KALMAN FILTER MODEL 
Kalman filter is widely applied in many 
engineering fields, it was developed in the 1960s to 
recursively estimate the state vector of dynamic 
systems. In GNSS receivers, KF is utilized in different 
ways, to integrate inertial sensors with the GNSS 
receiver at different levels [20], or it is embedded in 
the tracking part of the receivers with vector tracking 
loop architecture [21]. Commonly, the KF uses a state 
vector containing the receiver position coordinates 
and clock bias along with corresponding derivatives 
[20][22]. In this paper, the receiver is designed to 
work with GPS L1 and Galileo E1b signal, therefore 
the state vector consists of 9 states as follows: 
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!! =
!!−!Δ!!"#,!−!Δ!!"#,!!!−!Δ!  
(1) 
where !! ∈ ℝ! is the position coordinate vector; Δ!!"#,!  and Δ!!"#,!  are the difference between the 
receiver's clock and system time of GPS and Galileo, 
respectively; c is the speed of light; Δ! is the clock 
drift. 
With !!"# being the total number of satellites, the 
notation used for the filter description at epoch !! is: 
• !! ∈ ℝ! is the process state vector. 
• !! ∈ ℝ!×! is the state transition matrix relating !! to !!!!. 
• !! ∈ ℝ! is the process noise vector, assumed to 
be a white sequence with known covariance 
matrix !!. 
• !! ∈ ℝ!!!"#  is the measurement vector 
containing the pseudorange and Doppler 
measurement for each satellite. 
• !! ∈ ℝ!!!"#×! is the matrix giving the linear 
connection between the measurement and the 
state vector. 
• !! ∈ ℝ!!!"#  is the measurement error vector, 
which is assumed white with known covariance !! and zero crosscorrelation with !!. 
• !! is the covariance matrix of !!, it is assumed 
to be diagonal. 
The linear connection matrix !! is given by [2]: 
!! = !!,!"# ! ! ! !!!,!"# ! ! ! !! ! ! !!,!"# !! ! ! !!,!"# !  (2) 
where each row of !!,!"# ∈ ℝ!!"#×!  is the unit 
vector pointing from the linearization point to the 
location of each satellite [22], in which !!,!"#  and !!,!"# contain the vectors corresponding to satellites 
of GPS and Galileo constellation, respectively.  
In this work, the alternative form of Kalman filter 
is used [22]. The state covariance matrix !!  is 
calculated from the apriori covariance matrix !!! as: !!!! = !!! !! + !!!!!!!! (3) 
Then the result of (3) is inverted to obtain !!. The 
apriori covariance matrix !!!  is the predicted error 
covariance of the state estimate !!  of !! , can be 
propagated from the previous epoch: !!! = !!!!!!!!!!!!! + !!!! (4) 
 !!  can be initialized by either assuming to be 
diagonal with large value [25], or estimated using 
Least-square results of several initializing steps. 
The Kalman Gain !! is given by: !! = !!!!!!!!! (5) 
The state estimate !! can be calculated from the 
predicted state vector !!! as: !! = !!! + !! !! − !!!!!!!  (6) !!!  is propagated from the previous epoch by !!! = !!!!!!. 
III. PROTECTION LEVEL EQUATION DERIVATION 
As introduced earlier, the Protection Level is an 
overbound   
The derivation for the Protection Level (PL) 
equation follows a similar approach to one described 
in [11] and [27], considering the KF model. In [27], 
the integrity risk is defined to cover both fault 
detection and fault exclusion. 
For fault detection, the event of integrity risk 
occurrence can be defined when there is a large error 
(larger than the PL) but no fault was detected. For 
each fault mode q, the integrity risk for the s-
coordinate is defined as a joint probability: ! !!,! >  !", Δ!!,!(!)  <  !!,!!   (7) 
where !!,! =  !! −  !!(0) is the true error of !!(0). 
For simplicity, the derivation in this section will 
omit the notation of !, since all the Kalman filter-
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related vectors and matrices are all correspond to 
discrete time !!. That said, (7) can be rewritten as: ! !! > !", Δ!!! < !!(!)  (8) 
Defining !− = ! −  !− as the error of the apriori 
state estimation !− , the difference between the 
updated and true state vector can be expressed as: ! ! − ! =  !− − ! + ! ! ! − !!−  = !! − ! + ! ! !" + ! − !!!  = ! ! ! − ! !! + ! ! ! = ! ! !! + ! ! ! (9) 
where  ! ! = ! ! ! − ! ! 0 = !" − ! (10) 
From (7) we have: ! !!,! > !", Δ!!,!! < !!,!!  =  ! !!! − !! > !", !!! − !!! < !! !  = ! !!! − !!! + !!! − !! > !",!!! − !!! < !! !  ≤ ! !!! − !!! + !!! − !! > !",!!! − !!! < !! !  ≤ ! !!! − !! > !" − !! ! ,!!! − !!! < !! !  ≤ ! !!! − !! > !" − !! !  = !   !" −  !! !!!!      
(11) 
where Q(⋅) is the complement of the Gaussian 
cumulative distribution function, with zero mean and 
unit variance, and !!! is defined as: !!! 2 = ! ! !−! ! ! + ! ! !! ! ! !,!= !!"#! !,! (12) 
Let pfaultq be the fault probability for fault mode !, the 
boundary for the integrity risk in case of detection can 
be written as: 
!!"#,! = !!"#$%! ! !" − !!!σ!!
!!"#$%
!=0  = !!"#$%! ! !"σ!! + !!"#$%! ! !" − !! !σ!!
!!"#$%
!!!  ≤  Q   PLσ!!       +    !!"#$%! !  !"  −  !! !!!!    
!!"#$%
!!!  
(13) 
The first term of (13) represents the event of no 
detection under fault-free condition, while the second 
terms represents the missed detection when subset ! is 
faulty. 
In case of exclusion, the event of integrity risk 
occurrence can be defined when there is a large error 
(larger than the PL), a fault is detected and an 
exclusion candidate ! is actually excluded. Note that 
for a subset ! to be excluded, all fault hypothesis ! on 
the remaining satellite set must pass the solution 
separation test. For each exclusion candidate !  and 
each fault mode ! , the integrity risk for exclusion 
along the !-coordinate is defined as: ! !!! > !",    !!!!   > !! ! ,!!!!,! < !! !,!  (14) 
where !!!!,! = !!!,! − !!!  is the solution 
separation for fault mode ! after excluding candidate !, i.e. considering the remaining satellites as all in 
view; !sj  is the positioning error after having 
removed subset !; !!!,!  is the test threshold for the 
corresponding solution separation. Notice that subset ! 
is detected to be a fault due to Δ!!! > !!! , then is 
removed because Δ!!!,! < !!!,! . Following similar 
derivation as for detection case, (14) can be written as: ! !!! > !", Δ!!! > !! ! ,Δ!!!,! < !! !,!  ≤ ! !!! > !",Δ!!!,! < !! !,!  (15) 
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= ! !!! − !! > !",!!!,! − !!! < !! !,!  ≤ ! !!!,! − !! > !" − !! !,!  = !   !" −  !! !,!!!!,!      
Considering all exclusion hypothesis ! and all fault 
mode !, the integrity risk in case of exclusion can be 
expressed as: !!"#,!
= !!"#$%! ! !" − !!!,!!!!,!
!!"#$%
!=1
!!"#$%
!=0  = !!"#$%! ! !"!!!!!"#$%!!!+ !!"#$%! ! !"!!!!!"#$%!!!+ !!"#$%! ! !" − !! !,!!!!,!!!"#$%!!!!!!
!!"#$%
!!!  
≤ ! !"!!!  
!!"#$%
!!! + !!"#$%! ! !"!!!  
!!"#$%
!!!+ !!"#$%! ! !" − !! !,!!!!,!
!!"#$%
!!!!!!
!!"#$%
!!!  
(16) 
The first term in the last line of (16) represents 
wrong exclusion of subset ! under fault free condition. 
The second term represents the case where ! = !, ! >0 which is the correct exclusion case. Note that with ! = !, subset (!, !) simplifies to (!) since they are the 
same subset. The third term represents the wrong 
exclusion case with ! ≠ ! , i.e. excluding subset ! 
while the fault is in fact in subset !. 
From (13) and (16), the PL equation for both 
detection and exclusion can be formally expressed as: !!"# = !!"#,! + !!"#,! (17) 
= ! !"σ!! + !!"#$%! ! !" − !! !σ!!
!!"#$%
!!!  + !!!"#$%!!! !"σ!! + !!"#$%! !
!!"#$%
!!!
!"σ!!+ !!"#$%! ! !" − !! !,!!!!,!
!!"#$%
!!!!!!
!!"#$%
!!!  
(17) is the formal equation to evaluate the PL, 
which takes into account the integrity risks from both 
detection and exclusion. However, this form should be 
considered as a predictive form to calculate PL before 
either the events of detection and exclusion occurs. In 
practice, only certain terms of the equation should be 
used in certain cases, to avoid suboptimal allocation 
of the integrity risk and thus ensure sufficient 
availability. Therefore, in case of simple detection 
without exclusion implementation, the practical 
equation should eliminate the exclusion terms (since 
there are no exclusion candidate to be considered): !!"#,0 = ! !"σ!0  + !!"#!"! ! !" − !! !σ!!
!!"#$%
!!!  (18) 
In case of fault detection and exclusion of a subset !, the missed detection terms (the first two terms) of 
(17) should be eliminated since at least a fault was 
detected on subset !, and the exclusion terms should 
only consider the excluded subset !: !!"#,!
= ! !"σ!! + !!"#!"! ! !"!!!
!!"#$%,!
!=1
+ !!"#$%! ! !" − !!!,!!!!,!
!!"#$%,!
!=1  (19) 
Equation (17) and the other forms of (18), (19) are 
the generalized equations for PL along the direction of ! coordinate. From this, the specific equation for VPL 
and HPL can be defined for each case accordingly. In 
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case of no detection, the equation for VPL can be 
written as: !!"#,!"#$,0 = ! !"#!30  + !!"#$%! ! !"# − !!!!!!
!!"#$%
!!!  (20) 
 
The equations for HPL can be defined as: 12  !!"#,!"#,! = ! !"#!!!!  + !!"#$%! ! !"#! − !!!!!!
!!"#$%
!!!  12!!"#,!"#,! = ! !"#!!!!   + !!"#$%! ! !"#2 − !2!!2!
!!"#$%
!=1  !"# = !"#!! + !"#!!  (21) 
In case of exclusion, the equation for VPL can be 
defined as: !!"#,!"#$,! = ! !"#σ3!  + !!"#$%! ! !"#!!!
!!"#$%
!!!+ !!"#$%! ! !"# − !!!,!!!!,!
!!"#$%
!!!  (22) 
Similarly, the equations for HPL can be defined as: 12 !!"#,!"#,! = ! !"#1!1!  + !!"#$%! ! !"#!!!!
!!"#$%
!!!+ !!"#$%! ! !"#! − !!!,!!!!,!
!!"#$%
!!!  (23) 
12 !!"#,!"#,! = ! !"#2!2!  + !!"#$%! ! !"#!!!!
!!"#$%
!!!+ !!"#$%! ! !"#! − !!!,!!!!,!
!!"#$%
!!!  !"# = !"!!! + !"!!!  
IV. ARAIM FOR KALMAN FILTER 
 
Figure 1. Algorithm Scheme 
A. Concept 
The overall scheme of the Kalman filter-based 
ARAIM algorithm is proposed on Figure 1. Instead of 
predicting forward using the state transition matrix, 
the algorithm calculates the fault-tolerant Kalman 
gains  !!! , state corrections ! !!  and the error 
covariance matrices !!! , using subsets of satellites. 
Here, q denotes a case corresponding to a subset of 
satellites, called fault mode, or fault hypothesis. The 
initial all-in-view state vector ! !!  and fault-tolerant 
state vectors ! !!  are used as inputs for the Solution 
Separation (SS) tests, which measure the consistency 
of the measurement based on the deviation between 
the fault-tolerant and the all-in-view states. If any of 
the tests fails, exclusion will be attempted on potential 
faulty satellites. Otherwise, the algorithm will proceed 
to calculate the Protection Levels, before projecting 
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the state and error covariance matrix ahead. The 
whole process is then repeated for the next epoch. 
B. Fault tolerant derivation 
The SS approach of the algorithm involves running 
the Kalman filter repeatedly on various subsets of 
satellites, or fault mode. The subset of satellites of 
fault mode q is denoted ! ! , while ! !  denotes the 
set containing all the satellites in view. For each fault 
mode q, a diagonal matrix ! !  is defined as: ! ! !, ! = ! ! ! + !!"# , ! + !!"#  = 1  if ! ∈ ! !0 otherwise (24) 
With this, the fault tolerant observation matrix !!! , measurement vector !!! , and measurement 
error covariance !!!  are given by:                !!! = ! ! !!                 !!! = ! ! !!                !!! = ! ! !!! !                 = ! ! ! ! !! = ! ! !! (25) 
Noting that, both !!  and ! !  are diagonal 
matrices, therefore their multiplication are 
commutative. Let  !!! ! be the Moore-Penrose 
pseudoinverse of  !!! . In fact, since the 
pseudoinverse of ! !  is itself and !!!!  is also 
diagonal,  !!! ! is given by:  !!! ! = ! ! !!!! (26) 
Replacing (25) and (26) into (3), the fault tolerant 
state covariance matrix !!!  can be obtained from: !!! !! = !!! !! +  !!! !  !!! !! !!!  = !!! !! +  !!!! ! !!!! !!!  (27) 
Similarly, replacing (25) and (26) into (5), the fault 
tolerant Kalman Gain  !!! can be written as:  !!! =  !!!  !!! !! ! !!!! (28) 
The fault tolerant state update !!!  can be 
expressed as: !!! = !!! +  !!!  !!! −  !!! !!!  = !!! +  !!! !! − !!!!!  (29) 
C. Proposed ARAIM algorithm 
With the analysis and derivation from previous 
sections, the detailed algorithm is presented here step 
by step. The proposed algorithm uses the apriori 
estimate !k−  and the apriori error covariance !!−  as 
inputs. Their initial estimates can be obtained 
processing several initialization epochs using least-
square positioning method. Once initialized, the 
algorithm consists of six steps, detailed as follows. 
Step 1. All-in-view state update 
In this step, the state vector and error covariance 
are updated following the aforementioned Kalman 
filter loop, using all available measurements. Note 
that the observation matrix !! has to be defined in 
ENU coordinate, using the apriori estimate !!− as the 
origin.  
The output state vector and error covariance matrix 
are denoted !!(0) and !!0 , respectively. 
Step 2. Number of fault modes 
This step follows the formula of conventional 
ARAIM, presented in [11]. Output of this step is the 
maximum number of concurrent satellite faults !!"#,!"# and the total number of fault modes !!"#$%. 
In other word, !!"#$% represents the total number of 
possible satellite combinations by excluding from 1 to !!"#,!"# satellites: 
!!"#$% = !!"#!!"# − !
!!"#,!"#
!=1  (30) 
Step 3.  Fault tolerant state update 
Fault tolerant state is the state obtained by doing 
the correction step of KF using a subset of 
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measurements, excluding potential faulty satellites. 
For each ! from 1 to !!"#$%, the algorithm determines: 
• The fault tolerant state !!! , 
• The difference Δ!!(!) between !!(!) and !!(!) 
• The covariance of Δ!!(!), denoted !!!!!  
The posteriori state covariance !!!  is obtained 
from (27), rewritten here for completeness: !!! −1 =  !!− −1 +  !!!! ! !!−1!!! (31) 
The fault tolerant Kalman gain is computed as 
(28): !!!   =  !!!  !!! ! !  !!−1 (32) 
The fault tolerant state estimation update can be 
obtained as (29): !!(!) = !!− + !!! !! − !!!!−  (33) 
The difference between fault tolerant and all in 
view state updates is thus: Δ!!(!) = !!!   −  !!  = !!!   −  !!   !!   −  !!  !!!   (34) 
The covariance matrix !!!!!  of Δ!!(!) is calculated 
as: !!!!! = !!0 + !!!  −2 ! − !!!! !!! ! − !!! !! !+ !!!!!!! !  (35) 
The alternative state covariance matrix !!,!"#! , 
which will be used to calculate the Protection Level, is 
given by: !!,!"#! = ! − !!! !! !!− ! − !!! !! !+ !!! !!!!! ! (36) 
Step 4. Solution separation threshold test 
Let ! = 1,2,3  corresponds to east, north, up 
component, respectively. For each fault mode !, the 
solution separation (SS) test is executed on all 3 
components of coordinates: north, east and up. For 
each component, the test threshold is calculated as: !!,!! = !!",! !!",! (37) 
 
where: 
!! !,! = !!!!! !,! (38) 
The coefficients !!",1 follow the same formula as for 
ARAIM [11]: !!",1 = !!",2 = !−1 !!"_!"#4!!"!"#  !!",3 = !−1 !!"_!"#$2!!"#$%  
(39) 
Where !−1 !  is the (1 − !)-quantile of a Normal 
distribution; !!"_!"# and !!"_!"#$ are the probability 
of false alarm allocated along the horizontal and 
vertical direction, respectively, and are usually chosen 
based on the intended application. 
The SS test is considered passed if for all ! and ! 
we have: 
τ!,!! = !!,!!!!,!! ≤ 1 (40) 
If any of the test fail, the fault mode with failed test 
becomes a candidate for exclusion. 
Step 5. Exclusion 
The failed fault modes are sorted in decreasing 
order of !!,!! , with ! denotes any failed fault mode, or 
exclusion candidate. For each !, the satellites set ! !  
are treated as all-in-view set, then the algorithm (from 
Step 1 to Step 4) is executed again, using all fault-
tolerant solution !!!,!  within the candidate set ! ! . If 
all the SS test are passed, i.e. τ!,!!,! < 1 ∀! ≠ !, ! ! is 
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considered a consistent satellite set, the remaining 
satellites (those in ! 0   −  ! ! ) will be excluded.  
When a good satellite set is found (with all SS tests 
passed), the algorithm will proceed to PL calculation. 
Step 6. Protection Level 
The PL equations used here are derived earlier in 
Section III. Let:  !!! = !!,!"#! !,! ∀! = 0. .!!"#$% (41) 
Let !!"#,!"#$  and !!"#,!"#  denote the integrity 
risk allocated to the vertical and horizontal, 
respectively. Similar to !!"_!"#  and !!"_!"#$ , the 
allocated integrity risks are chosen based on the 
intended application. In case of no exclusion, the VPL 
is the solution to the equation: ! !"#!!! + !!"#$%! !
!!"#$%
!!!
!"# − !!,!!!!!= !!"#,!"#$ (42) 
Similarly, the HPL is calculated on 2 directions of 
the horizontal plane, namely !"#1  and !"#2 , as 
follows (with ! = 1,2): ! !"#!!! + !!"#$%! !
!!"#$%
!!!
!"# − !!,!!!!!= !!"#,!"# (43) 
The final HPL is then computed as: !"#  =   !"!!!   +  !"!!!  (44) 
On the other hand, if exclusion was attempted and 
subset candidate ! was excluded from the satellite set, 
then the PL equations are defined to account for the 
event. In this case, the VPL is the solution to the 
equation: 
!!"#,!"#$
= 2! !"#!3! + !!"#$%! !
!!"#$%,!
!=1
!"#!3!
+ !!!"#$! !!!"#$%,!!=1 !"# − !!,3
!,!!3!,!  
(45) 
where !!"#$%,!  is the number of fault in the 
remaining set of satellites after excluding exclusion 
candidate !. 
The HPL is calculated in similar manner as in the 
no detection case: 
 12 !!"#,!"#= 2! !"#1!1! + !!"#$%! !
!!"#$%,!
!=1 !!"#1!1!
+ !!"#$%! !!!"#$%,!!=1 !"#1 − !1
!,!!1!,!  12 !!"#,!"#= 2! !"#2!2! + !!"#$%! !
!!"#$%,!
!=1 !!"#2!2!
+ !!"#$%! !!!"#$%,!!=1 !"#2 − !1
!,!!2!,!  !"#  =   !"!!!   +  !"!!!  (46) 
V. DISCUSSION 
The proposed algorithm has many points that can 
be further exploited to suit different applications. The 
first possible derivation is the allocation of integrity 
risk budget. For example, the conventional ARAIM 
algorithm [11] (LS-based) was developed for aviation, 
hence the integrity risk is allocated with higher 
priority for vertical error. On the other hand, 
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applications in urban environment can put higher 
budget in horizontal error, or start with a different 
total integrity risk budget. 
The noise model also allows potential 
modification. In RAIM algorithm in general, the noise 
model acts as a (hypothetical) overbound of the 
measurement error, which then contributes to the 
consistency tests and the PL calculation step. While 
different operating environment may have cause 
measurement error with different nature, [30] has 
shown that incorrect assumption of the measurement 
error may lead to unnecessary loss of availability. 
Therefore it is possible to modify the underlying noise 
model when adapting the algorithm for different 
scenarios. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposed an adaptation of the 
conventional ARAIM algorithm for KF. A detailed 
derivation of the PL equations was presented, taking 
into account the KF model, covering both detection 
and fault exclusion scenario. The proposed algorithm 
can serve as a generic model, a starting point for 
modification based on application requirements.  
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